


# The Office of General Counsel



**THIS PRESENTATION**

**IS CLASSIFIED**

**TOP SECRET//COMINT//**



# *General Principles of Law*

- Principle #1: Authority  
(What is the authority to do my job?)
- Principle #2 Restrictions  
(Is the authority restricted in any way?)



# Constitution

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

## Fourth Amendment

- Protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.
- Requires probable cause for a search warrant.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



# *Supreme Court Cases*

- Olmstead v.  
U.S.  
(1928)
- Katz v. U.S.  
(1967)

## *Operation Shamrock: 1945-1975*

- NSA received copies of international telegrams to, from, and transiting the U.S.
- Included virtually all international telegrams carried by major telecom carriers.
- In later years, 150,000 telegrams per month reviewed by NSA analysts
- Probably the largest governmental interception program affecting Americans ever undertaken

# *Project Minaret: 1967-1973*

## *(The Watch List)*

- Names of U.S. persons used systematically as basis for selecting messages
- Foreign influence on Domestic Antiwar and Civil Rights Activists



## *Narcotics Collection: 1970-1973*

- Telephone Links between the U.S. and South America collected
- Used Names of U.S. persons
- Obtained Communications that Law Enforcement could not acquire under Title III

# *The Problem...*

**Congressional Inquiries  
Church/Pike Committees**

**Information TO, FROM, and ABOUT U.S.  
Citizens was:**

**Improperly Collected  
Improperly Retained  
Improperly Disseminated**

# *Results of Church Committee and Other Investigations*

- Termination of illegal collection activities
- Executive Order requiring the establishment of procedures relating to U.S. person information
- Greater Executive and Legislative Oversight



# *Congressional/Executive Response to IC Abuses*

■ Federal Law



Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act (as amended)

■ Executive Order

E.O. 12333

Intelligence Activities



■ Regulations and  
Procedures

DoD 5240.1-R and

Classified Annex



USSID SPOO18 (USSID 18)

Minimization Procedures

*End of Module One*



# *The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)*

- The FISA, was originally passed in 1978.
- Most recently amended in the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008.
- Defines “electronic surveillance” and requires an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to conduct such surveillance.
- As amended, by the FAA, requires that the USG obtain a court order to conduct electronic surveillance against US persons either in the US or abroad.



# *Definitions*

- Electronic Surveillance
- U.S. Person
- Foreign Power
- Agent of a Foreign Power
- Contents

# FISA

## *“Electronic Surveillance”*

- f(1): acquisition of communications of particular known USP inside the US by targeting that person
- f(2): acquisition of wire communication to or from a person in the US if acquisition occurs inside the US
- f(3): acquisition of radio communications if all parties to the communication are located inside the US
- f(4): monitoring in the US to acquire information other than from a radio or wire communication

## *Definitions -- U.S. Persons*

- U.S. Citizen
- Permanent Resident Alien  
(Green Card Holder)
- Corporations (incorporated in the U.S.)
- Associations (primary membership  
composed of U.S. persons)
- U.S. flagged ships/aircraft



## *Definitions -- Foreign Power*

- A foreign government or any component thereof
- A faction of a foreign nation
- An entity openly acknowledged to be directed or controlled by a foreign government(s)
- a group engaged in international terrorism
- a foreign based political organization

## *Definitions -- Agent of a foreign power*

- An officer or employee of a foreign power
- A spy, terrorist, saboteur, aider/abettor, or conspirator

# *Definitions -- Contents*

Communications

---

Any information concerning the identity of the parties to such communications  
OR

“Substance”

“Purport”

“Meaning”

“Existence”



# *FISA Amendments Act of 2008*

- Became law in July 2008
- Applies to targets overseas
- Sections 702/703/704/705

# *FISA Amendments Act of 2008*

## *Section 702*

- Authorizes the USG to gather foreign intelligence by targeting foreign persons reasonably believed to be outside the US with authorization jointly executed by the AG and DNI.
- The government must employ targeting procedures and minimization procedures which comply with the statute and which are reviewed by the FISC.
- Prohibits “reverse targeting” .

# *FISA Amendments Act of 2008*

## *Section 703*

- Authorizes “electronic surveillance” against a USP reasonably believed to be outside of the US, but --
- An order from the FISC is required.
- Target must be a “foreign power”, “agent of a foreign power”, or officer or employee of a foreign government.



# *FISA Amendments Act of 2008*

## *Section 704*

- Authorizes “other acquisitions” targeting US persons overseas – but
- An order from the FLSC is required.
- The FLSC does not review surveillance techniques.

# *FISA Amendments Act of 2008*

## *Section 705*

- 705(a) – a judge may simultaneously authorize acquisitions conducted both inside and outside of the US against a USP overseas (703 and 704).
- 705(b) – if there is an existing FISA order authorizing surveillance of target inside of the US, the AG can authorize targeting while the USP is reasonably believed to be outside of the US.

# *FISA Procedures*

- Establishes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
- Provides criteria/requirements for applications
- Establishes Congressional Oversight



## E.O. 12333

### *United States Intelligence Activities*

- Provides goals, directions, and responsibilities for the Intelligence Community
- Defines NSA's responsibilities (Part 1.12(b))
- Requires each agency to have AG- approved procedures, for collection, processing and dissemination of U.S. person information

## E.O. 12333

### *United States Intelligence Activities*

- Provides goals, directions, and responsibilities for the Intelligence Community
- Defines NSA's responsibilities (Part 1.7(c))
- Requires each agency to have AG- approved procedures, for collection, processing and dissemination of U.S. person information



## E.O. 12333

### *United States Intelligence Activities*

- Collection, Processing, and Dissemination of Signals Intelligence for National Foreign Intelligence Purposes.
- Collection, Processing, and Dissemination for Signals Intelligence for Counterintelligence Purposes.
- SIGINT Support for Military Operations.
- Information Assurance.



# *REGULATIONS*

## DoD 5240.1-R (1982)

Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD  
Intelligence Components that Affect  
U.S. Persons

## NSA/CSS Policy 1-23

Procedures Governing the Activities of NSA/CSS  
that Affect U.S. Persons

**End of Module Two**





# ~~(U//FOUO)~~ FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705 Minimization

## Procedures

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Anyone targeting US persons located outside of the US under FAA is required to read and be familiar with the minimization procedures

(U) The Overall Classification of this presentation is  
**TOP SECRET//COMINT//**

FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705

~~Classified by 10-200143~~  
~~Declassify on:~~  
~~Declassify on:~~  
~~Declassify on:~~



# (U) Requirements

FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705

(U) The FAA may authorize collection against:

- ✓ A US person
- ✓ Reasonably believed to be outside of the US
- ✓ To acquire foreign intelligence information

Targeting US persons located outside of the US



## (U) Limitations

NSA Surveillance Under Sections 703, 704, and 705

(U) NSA CANNOT use FAA authorities to target:

- Anything/Anyone in the US

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA FAA data CANNOT be:

- ~ Accessed without being properly trained on NSA's FAA minimization procedures
- ~ Processed at locations other than those approved by SID

Targeting US persons located outside of the US



(U) *FISA Amendments Act of 2008*

## Section 703

- (U) An order from the FISC to target a US person reasonably believed to be outside the US
- (U) Authorizes “electronic surveillance” or the acquisition of stored electronic communications or stored electronic data
- (U) Authorization for up to 90 days

Targeting US persons located outside of the US



(U) *FISA Amendments Act of 2008*  
**Section 704**

- (U) An order from the FISC to target a US person reasonably believed to be outside the US
- (U) Authorizes “other acquisitions” targeting US persons overseas (techniques are not described to the court)
- (U) Authorization for up to 90 days



*(U) FISA Amendments Act of 2008**Section 705*

- (U) Section 705 has two parts, 705(a) and 705(b).
- (U) 705(a) authorizes the Government to request, and a judge to issue a single order authorizing 703 and 704 surveillance
  - (U) 705(b) authorizes the AG to approve surveillance of a US person overseas if the FISC has already issued an order authorizing electronic surveillance or physical search against that US person in the US



## NSA Minimization Procedures for Collection Under FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705

# (U//~~FOUO~~) Minimization Procedures need to be Followed Unless...

- (U//~~FOUO~~) To protect US National Security, life or property, or for Law enforcement purposes – NSA may deviate from Standard Minimization Procedures with AG approval (coordinate in advance with NSA OGC)
- (U//~~FOUO~~) If advance coordination is not feasible and NSA needs to act in order to protect against immediate threat to human life – consult with NSA OGC who must report any such action within 7 days to DOJ
- (U) If you believe you must deviate from the procedures, **YOU MUST GO TO NSA/OGC FIRST!!!**



NSA Minimization Procedures for Under FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705

## (U) Collection

(S//SI//)

- NSA must terminate collection promptly if NSA learns that a targeted US person is located in the US
- Collection against a US person in the US may only be reinstated in accordance with the FISA
- NSA may resume collection if the target departs the US during the life of the order
- Selectors for 704 and 705 surveillances may be tasked

targeting US persons located outside of the US

NSA Minimization Procedures Under FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705

# (U) Processing

(U//~~FOUO~~) Searches or reviews of collected materials must be designed, to the extent operationally possible, to minimize the risk of returning data concerning unconsenting US person 's who are not the target of authorized surveillance

Targeting US persons located outside of the US



NSA Minimization Procedures Under FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705

## Retention

(S//SI// ) The following communications shall be destroyed upon recognition unless the AG authorizes retention:

- Inadvertent collection of communications while the target enters the US
- Inadvertent collection of communications in which all the communicants are in the US
- Inadvertent collection of communications in which all the communicants are US persons who are not authorized targets

Targeting US persons located outside of the US



# (U) AG Destruction Waiver

## Inadvertent Collection:

- All communicants inside the US
- All communicants are US person's who are not authorized targets
- The authorized target is in the US

Data shall be destroyed unless the AG determines that the communication contains:

- Significant foreign intelligence
- Evidence of a serious crime
- Information related to a threat of serious harm to life or property
- Technical information about a communications vulnerability

Targeting US persons located outside of the US

# (U) Without AG Destruction Waiver

Inadvertent  
Collection:

- Of US domestic communications
- Against an unauthorized target

Even without a Destruction  
Waiver, technical data  
concerning such  
communications may be  
retained for collection  
avoidance purposes

Targeting US persons located outside of the US



NSA Minimization Procedures Under FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705

## (U) Retention

- (U//~~FOUO~~) NSA may retain FAA data in databases for up to 5 years without additional authorization
- (U//~~FOUO~~) NSA's SIGINT Director may authorize retention for a longer period in response to an authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence requirement



# (U) Incident Reporting

(U//~~FOUO~~) All incidents should be reported at the time of recognition AND again in the IG Quarterly report

(U//~~FOUO~~) Incidents include:

- Inadvertent and incidental collection
- Unauthorized targets
- Collection continued on targets inside the U S
- Unauthorized access to data:
  - By unauthorized personnel
  - By untrained personnel
  - At non-SID-approved locations
- Inappropriate storage, labeling, or handling

Targeting US persons located outside of the US



# Requirements for Data Access

(U//~~FOUO~~) To gain access to data both the individual user and the location must be certified

- The user must:
  - Complete this training (renewing it every two years)
  - Maintain current Annual Intelligence Oversight readings
  - Work under DIRNSA's full operational & technical control
  - Have a mission need
- The location must:
  - Operate under DIRNSA's full operational & technical control
  - Possess a delegated mission
  - Have SID approval for access to FAA data
  - Have an established oversight infrastructure

Targeting US persons located outside of the US



FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705

## (U) Where to go for Help

(U//~~FOUO~~)

OGC: DL GC\_FISA

(after hours contact NSOC SOO to get in touch with OGC)

Oversight and Compliance: DL FISATEAM

Targeting Mission Management (TMM): DL OPSDICTS

Documents Available at SV1 Homepage: ('go SV')

- For the Minimization Procedures document
- Comparison charts of 703/704/705 orders
- Specific targets authorized under these sections

Targeting US persons located outside of the US



# *USSID SP0018*

## *Legal Compliance and Minimization Procedures*

- Main body of SP0018 Compilation of responsibilities from the FLSA, E.O. 12333, and DoD Regulation 5240.1-R as they apply to the U.S. SIGINT system
- covers collection, processing, retention, and dissemination

# *What is "Collection"?*

- Targeting a **SPECIFIC COMMUNICANT** (e.g. a terrorist, a foreign minister, a computer hacker)
- Collecting based upon **SUBJECT MATTER** (e.g. nuclear proliferation, oil sales, economics)



# *Targeting Specific Communicants*

## *SPOO18 Section 4*

### The Four Rules

- No  
General approval  
without Attorney
- No U.S. Persons in the U.S. without a  
Court Order
- No U.S. persons outside the U.S. without  
a Court Order
- Foreign persons outside the U.S. -- fair  
game

# *Targeting by Subject Matter*

## *USSID SPOO18 Section 5*

- Selection terms that:
  - have intercepted or
  - are likely to intercept
- U.S. Person communications
- MUST BE DESIGNED
  - (to the greatest extent practicable under the circumstances)
- to DEFEAT communications that
- do not contain foreign intelligence



# *Targeting Issues*

## Presumptions

(If no other information is available)

- In the U.S., then U.S. person
- Outside the U.S., then foreigner

# *Targeting Definitions*

## Targeting U.S. Persons

- INADVERTENT (Did not know is a U.S. Person)
- INCIDENTAL (Legitimate foreign target; as a by product NSA acquires U.S. Person information/communications)
- REVERSE (Target foreign entity to intentionally acquire U.S. Person information/communications)



# USSID SPOO18

## *Dissemination*

- Allow access to non-minimized raw traffic voice/data database
- Provide copy of a non-minimized piece of raw traffic
- Disclose (orally or in writing) the contents of non-minimized raw traffic
- Disclose (orally or in writing) the identity of a U.S. person contained in an NSA product

# USSID SPOO18

## *Dissemination*

Authorized Recipients of Raw Traffic

### THE SIGINT PRODUCTION CHAIN

People who Collect Raw Traffic

People who Process Raw Traffic

People who Retain Raw Traffic

People who Manage the SIGINT Process

People who do Oversight of the SIGINT Process



# USSID SPOO18

## *Dissemination*

### Examples of Non-SIGINT Production Personnel

- A Customer in Another Agency (e.g. CIA, FBI)
- Another Agency's Liaison Representative to NSA
- Non-SIGINT producing NSA Organizations or Personnel (e.g Security (Q), Personnel (MD))
- NSA Employees Detailed/Assigned to Another Agency (e.g. CIA/TMO, IOTC)
- Any person not necessary to Produce the SIGINT Product

**End of Module Three**






# Questions?

- Who is the target?
  - U.S. Person or Non-U.S. Person
- Where is the target?
  - In the U.S. or Outside the U.S.
- What kind of communications will be collected?
  - Private (e-mail, wire, cell, encrypted) or Non-Private
- How will the communications be collected?
  - Passively or Actively
- Where will the communications be collected?
  - In the U.S. or Outside the U.S., or in International Waters, or from Outer Space

*Questions?*

**Office of General  
Counsel**  
(Operations/Intel Law)



**NSOC has an attorney on call 24/7!**





# Database Access Briefing

## USSID SP0018 and Raw Traffic Databases

(U//~~FOUO~~) Contact O&C or the OGC if you have questions about this material

NSA SID Oversight and Compliance (Database

Team):

(nsts)

dl u18dbtarget

NSA SID Oversight and Compliance (Reporting

Team):

(nsts),

-----

dl ussid18



(U//~~FOUO~~) Contact O&C or the OGC if you have questions about this material

NSA Office of the General Counsel (Ops):

(nsts)

(for UNIX systems)

dl gcops (for NT users)

# (U//~~FOUO~~) Module 5

## Administration and Background



# (U//~~FOUO~~) Briefing Lifespan

2 Years – With use of USSID  
SP0018 sensitive databases

6 Months – Without use of  
USSID SP0018 sensitive databases

Why is this training required?

— This training covers access  
to and use of “Raw  
SIGINT” data and  
databases.



Raw SIGINT is: Results of collection BEFORE the information has been evaluated for foreign intelligence AND minimization purposes, per USSID CR1610.

**“Analysts are not permitted ... to roam freely in the universe of collected communications, examining messages which are not directly related to their assigned tasks.”**

**-Office of Intelligence Policy and Review**



Raw SIGINT access is  
restricted to those within a  
SIGINT Production Chain  
as defined by USSID  
CR1610.

There is no single “SPC”.

There are SPCs at various levels from organic SIGINT assets in the field through the NSA Product Line level.



Raw SIGINT databases contain completely innocent U.S. person communications and non-foreign intelligence information as well as FI.

To protect the privacy rights of U.S. citizens, Department of Justice has determined searches of these databases are a collection/targeting activity.



Database Queries =  
collection/targeting



Dictionary Tasking =  
collection/targeting

Protecting U.S. Persons' rights is only half the story. USSID SP0018, section 5.1 states that analysts must also ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that queries only target Foreign Intelligence.



## Sharing of SIGINT

In this age of data and information sharing, we must remain mindful of the current regulations that prohibit the casual sharing of SIGINT.

E.O. 12333, section 2.3 specifically addresses this.

Targeting for Personal Purposes  
If you know someone is using  
the SIGINT system for personal  
purposes, YOU have the  
responsibility to report the  
activity.



## Auditing Requirements

USSID CR1610 Annex A details auditing requirements for certain raw SIGINT systems. This auditing meets Department of Justice mandates for NSA's operations.

# Derivative Databases

If data is saved into another file or database, that derivative database must have the same access, auditing and retention issues that the originating database held



# Access and Retention USSID SP0018, Section 6

5 Years on-line

Up to 10 years off-line—request for historical searches  
made to OIPR

Some retention exceptions

Recognizes intrusiveness of SIGINT

FISA Data: Depends upon nature of data –check  
USSID SP0018, Annex A, and/or call SV

# Accountability of Access

NSA must account for:

1. Who uses SIGINT databases
2. What purpose
3. From what location
4. Under what controls



Therefore, accesses must be re-justified if:

1. You Change Offices or Mission
2. ~~You Change Locations~~
3. You Change Auditors
4. Your Account Lapses Due to Inactivity for 90 days

End of Module 5





**(U//FOUO) Module 6**

# **Protections and Restrictions**

(U//~~FOUO~~) How do we protect ourselves?

The best way to protect ourselves and our SIGINT is to play by the rules.

No matter how inconvenient the rules may seem, if we fail to adhere to them, the next set of rules will be far stricter.

(U//~~FOUO~~) There are very few things we cannot accomplish within the existing rules, using the authorities we have and those authorities we can receive.



(U//~~FOUO~~) Each phase of Production  
(collection, processing, retention, and  
dissemination) must be:

Accountable Defensible

Repeatable

Retrievable

(C/ ) Violations of authorities must be reported:

1. at the time of recognition to SID O&C
2. as part of the E.O. 12333 quarterly report to the IG

(U//~~FOUO~~) If you determine that you have made a targeting mistake:

1. Stop the query as soon as possible
2. Notify your auditor



(S//SI// ) Anyone using NSA SIGINT databases must abide by the same rules and authorities as NSA.

Access to these databases is restricted to persons operating under DIRNSA authority.

(C// ) In addition to having a National Foreign Intelligence purpose (which includes FI, Counter-intelligence and Support to Military Operations), the following general rules apply:

(C// ) Additional authority is required  
to target:

- U.S. persons (anywhere) or people within  
U.S. territory






(C// ) What is a Second Party Person?

In general terms, we apply the same basic definitions of a Second Party person as we apply for U.S. people.

U.S. Identities in SIGINT, Section 9 contains full definitions of each Second Party person.

 (U//~~FOUO~~) End of Module 6

(U//~~FOUO~~) Module 7

Production Guidance



(U//~~FOUO~~) Targeting Clarifications  
Each query is an act of targeting.

Start queries narrow; widen as  
necessary. Look out for queries that  
are too broad.



Reasonableness, Not Perfection!

(U//~~FOUO~~) Targeting takes place at front  
end via dictionaries AND at the keyboard  
with follow-on queries

Choose qualifiers carefully


“AND” and “BUT NOT” will reduce your results  
“OR” will expand your returns exponentially



(S//SI// ) E-Mail Address Targeting

Specific e-mail addresses of valid  
foreign intelligence targets outside

countries may be  
targeted regardless of email  
domain without additional  
authority.






(S//S// ) E-Mail Address Targeting

**Do Not:**

Wildcard domains

Wildcard user names

Wildcard across domains



# (S// )Dissemination Clarifications


E-mail addresses with U.S. domains may be included in dissemination if:

- a. the user is a foreign national (excluding AUS/CAN/NZL/GBR)
- b. Information is disseminated *only* to recipients who have a specific need for full addresses for a lawful government purpose.


# (S//SI// ) Targeting Clarifications

## Targeting

- Permanently assigned?
- Check      Lookup tools BEFORE the first query
- Defeat domains using the same but not a part of your target
- Do not wildcard






(S//SI// Targeting Clarifications

Avoid general search terms without  
valid FI selectors

visa   password   narcotics  
Bank




(Based on USSID SP0018, Sect. 5.1.c)

(S//SI// )


## Sole Selectors

Targeting all communications on a given      will flood you with information that has no FI value or is to/from/about USPs



# (S//SI// ) Avoid Site SIGADS as Sole Selectors


Do you need to see all  
information from a given  
site, or just select topics?





# (S//SI// ) Avoid Names as Sole Selectors


Use locations, associates, or  
activities to focus searches on  
your target and not just  
anyone with that same name



(C/SH ) Targeting foreign flagged ships or aircraft located in US territorial waters or airspace.

-COMINT stops at 12nm without additional authority


- ELINT to coastline and beyond pursuant to USSID AP2231



allowed if specific FI  
selectors are used as well.

(ex:

AND






(C// ) Dissemination Clarifications  
Equipment and product designators,  
such as , and brand  
names may be included in SIGINT  
reports, if the focus is on the *product*,  
not the manufacturer of the product.

(C//SI// Targeting Clarifications


Targeting Deceased U.S. People or  
communications devices registered to them  
requires:

- a. a VERY strong foreign intelligence  
purpose
- b. mission driver
- c. approval of the NSA OGC



(C//SI// ) Targeting Deceased  
People or communications devices registered to  
them requires:

- a. a VERY strong foreign intelligence purpose
- b. mission driver
- c. approval of the appropriate






(C//SI// ) Dissemination Clarification

Can deceased protected persons be named  
in dissemination?


U.S. : YES

: NO

(S//SI// ) DO NOT USE  
Raw Traffic repositories to  
verify the protected status  
of an entity.



(S//SI// ) Protected entities  
listed by name or context in  
dissemination do not imply  
collection  
is authorized.





(C// ) Imminent Threat to Safety  
COLLECTION: USSID SP0018, 4.1.d.(1)

DIRNSA may authorize the collection to, from, or about a USP outside the U.S. when life or physical safety is reasonably believed to be in immediate danger.

\*\*\*Contact NSOC\*\*\*

(C// ) Dissemination Clarification  
DISSEMINATION: USSID SP0018, 7.2.c.(6)

Information indicates that the identity of the USP is pertinent to a possible threat to the safety of any person or organization, including those who are targets, victims or hostages of international terrorist organizations.

## (C// ) Dissemination Clarification

If a person is in imminent danger and you have relevant information, you may disseminate that information unmasked in product and follow-up with SV afterwards.



(C// ) Why do we still need this  
level of oversight?

Past Abuses

targeting of  
international  
telegrams

Present Examples

targeting of

(C// ) Why do we still need this level of oversight?

### Past Abuses

Phone lines into the  
U.S. for identities of  
U.S. based narcotics  
smugglers

### Present Examples

Restaurant in Texas  
to identify narcotics  
smuggler

(C// ) Why do we still need this level of oversight?

### Past Abuses

Watch-listing U.S.  
people for evidence  
of foreign influence

### Present Examples

Unauthorized  
targeting of  
suspected terrorists  
in U.S.



(U//~~FOUO~~) End of Module 7



(U//~~FOUO~~) Module 8

Dissemination Guidance

# (U//~~FOUO~~) U.S. location identifiers in reports

Some US identifiers may be included when used in a LOCATIONAL SENSE (i.e. They identify a *place*).

- RESTAURANTS
- HOTELS
- AIRLINE FLIGHT NUMBERS
- AIRPORTS



## (U//~~FOUO~~) Avoid Contextual Identification

Don't provide so much detail about a masked protected identity that the reader could determine who is being referenced due to context.

## (C// ) Dissemination Authority

Generally, to include the identity of a U.S. person or entity in SIGINT product (by name, title, or context):

- 1) it must be necessary to understand or assess the foreign intelligence, and

2) the recipient must need that information to perform his/her official duties.

3) You will need the approval of Chief Information Sharing Services.


4) Keep your focus on the foreign intelligence.






(U//FOUO) End of Module 8

(C) 11 )




No chaining from or  
through U.S.  
contacts (email,  
phone, etc.)




Contacts  
Masked





(U//~~FOUO~~)





(S//SI// ) Why do U.S. SIGINT  
analysts care?

(S//SI// ) Tasking must comply with  
USSID SP0018 and .

(U//~~FOUO~~) End of Module 9